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This article discusses the history of Japan’s pursuit of its nuclear policy and 
views on nuclear weapons since the Second World War. It explains how 
Japan’s strategic thinking on nuclear weapons changed in accordance with 
changing security environment over the past decades, and the details of 
Japan’s past examinations of its nuclear option as well as Japan’s efforts to 
sustain and strengthen credible deterrence and policy on nuclear 
nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control. The article concludes that 
the likelihood for Japan to go nuclear seems extremely low as long as the 
current trend in the security environment may not experience significant 
transformation. Instead, Japan will continue to strengthen its alliance with the 
United States and overall deterrence posture while pursuing nuclear 
nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control together with the 
international community, especially with the countries in East Asia. This 
article also argues that Japan’s focus on nuclear option should not be seen as 
undermining the security and stability of Asia, but rather that it is a 
prerequisite, in a way, to foster healthy discussion over security policy in 
Japan, and to strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance, to prepare for new security 
challenges in evolving strategic environment in this region.  
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Introduction 
 
The possibility of Japan’s nuclear armament has been a subject of widespread 
international attention for many decades.3
                                               
1 The views expressed here are those of the author and do not represent those of the Research 
Institute for Science and Technology for Society or its research sponsors. 
 Although there are other countries that have 
2 This article was produced by expanding and updating the author’s another papers as below: 
“Making Sense of Japan’s Nuclear Policy: Arms Control, Extended Deterrence, and the Nuclear 
Option,” in Benjamin Self ed., Japan’s Nuclear Option: Security, Politics, and Policy in the 21st 
Century (The Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, D.C.: 2003), pp. 95-147; Hajime Izumi and 
Katsuhisa Furukawa, “Not Going Nuclear: Japan’s Response to North Korea’s Nuclear Test”, 
Arms Control Today, June 2007; Michael J. Green and Katsuhisa Furukawa, “Japan: New Nuclear 
Realism”, in Muthiah Alagappa. ed., The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in the 21st 
Century, Stanford University Press, California 2008; and Katsuhisa Furukawa, “Chapter 2: 
Conditions for Japan’s Nuclear Option”, in James Wortz ed., WMD 2020 (Stanford University 
Press) (forthcoming). 
3 In the realm of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the concern for Japan’s nuclear 
armament has drawn significant international attention over the past decades.  While Japan also 
possesses potential capability (both human resources and infrastructure) to produce some of the 
chemical and biological weapons (CBW), there barely existed any discussion about Japan’s option 
to use these weapons, after the end of the Second World War. Japan has sustained a posture of 
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latent nuclear capabilities, the issue of Japan’s nuclear future has almost always 
drawn the attention of the United States and Asian countries. Japan can hardly escape 
from these countries’ concerns that Japan’s interest in nuclear option might 
potentially invoke tsunami-effect among other Asian countries in their pursuit of 
nuclear weapons. Traditionally, Japan’s response to such claims used to be rather 
emotional, resorting to the resurrection of painful memories from the calamitous 
nuclear bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Today, however, Japan’s strategic 
culture has shifted from traditional pacifism to realism, as regional security 
environments have changed over the past years, and discussion on the hypothetical 
possibility of a nuclear option is certainly no longer a taboo. For a majority of 
Japanese, however, the scenario of a nuclear Japan is still regarded as far from reality, 
so much so that the Japanese regard foreign countries’ concerns about Japan’s nuclear 
future as exaggerated and a symbol of the others’ lack of understanding of Japan.   
This article discusses the history of Japan’s pursuit of its nuclear policy and 
views on nuclear weapons since the Second World War. The first section analyzes 
Japan’s nuclear policy and past examinations of its nuclear option until the end of the 
Cold War. The second section analyzes Japan’s strategic thinking on nuclear weapons 
in a changing security environment after the early 1990s when Japan has come to face 
increasing threats of North Korea’s WMD programs and uncertainty direction of 
Chinese military modernization. The final section examines Japan’s efforts to sustain 
and strengthen credible deterrence and policy on nuclear nonproliferation, 
disarmament, and arms control for the future.  
All in all, the likelihood for Japan to go nuclear seems extremely low as long 
as the current trend in the security environment may not experience significant 
transformation. Instead, Japan will continue to strengthen its alliance with the United 
States and overall deterrence posture while pursuing nuclear nonproliferation, 
disarmament, and arms control together with the international community, especially 
the countries in East Asia.  
 
 
Japan’s Nuclear Policy and Past Examinations of a Nuclear Option 
 
Japan’s Nuclear Policy  
Throughout most of the Cold War, Japan’s nuclear policy reflected two 
guiding pillars. The first was the so-called “Three Non-Nuclear Principles,” which 
prohibit Japan from manufacturing, possessing, or permitting the entry of nuclear 
weapons into the air, land or sea controlled by Japan. The adoption of these Principles 
was announced by Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato during the Diet session in 
December 1967. However, it is known that the U.S. military located nuclear weapons 
in Japan during the Cold War, despite these Principles.  
The “Four Nuclear Policies”, announced by Prime Minister Sato in 1968, is 
the second pillar. Japanese governments has pledged to (1) adhere to the Three Non-
Nuclear Principles, (2) pursue global nuclear disarmament, (3) limit the use of nuclear 
energy to peaceful purposes as defined by the 1955 Atomic Energy Basic Law, and 
(4) rely upon U.S. extended deterrence that is codified by the 1960 Japan- U.S. 
                                                                                                                                      
exclusive self-defense, and concentrated on developing conventional systems backed by US 
extended deterrence. Comparatively the CBW have been regarded as lacking reliability as a stable 
weapon, given that the capability of CBW can be significantly affected by natural condition, such 
as weather, temperature, or moisture level, in addition to all the conceivable problems that both 
conventional and nuclear weapons may generate. 
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Security Treaty. In keeping with these Four Nuclear Policies, Japan has embraced 
various international treaties and agreements. Above all anything else, Japan signed 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970 and then joined for its indefinite 
extension in 1995. Japan’s nuclear programs are also regulated by other international 
treaties and agreements, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
safeguards agreement, the IAEA Additional Protocol, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, 
and the London Guidelines on the exchange of chemical information. In addition, 
Japan has signed bilateral safeguards agreements with its major nuclear suppliers, 
including the United States, United Kingdom, France, Australia, and Canada. These 
agreements are intended to provide additional safeguards on transferred materials and 
technologies in the event that Japan should withdraw from the NPT. Various Japanese 
governments have chosen to deeply embed nuclear issues into a network of treaties, 
laws, and administrative regulations.  
Despite these policies, Japan’s nuclear option was speculated among foreign 
countries occasionally in the past, for example, in the aftermath of China’s nuclear 
testing in the 1960s and at the time of the international negotiations over the Non-
Proliferation Treaty both in the 1970s and in 1994-95 as well as during the North 
Korean nuclear crisis in 1993-94, and after the North Korean nuclear test in 2006 and 
2009.4
Thinking about the Nuclear Option: 1940 - 1960 
 Indeed, Japan’s nuclear policy has been based on the precondition that Japan 
was protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella.  Thus far, Japan has ruled out its nuclear 
armament option.  Because the United States is an independent actor, however, 
Japanese governments in the past have quietly re-examined the nuclear option at times 
of fundamental strategic shift in the international system. 
 
 
The 1940s 
In the spring of 1940 during the Second World War, the Japanese Army 
initiated a research project on uranium enrichment technology using gas diffusion 
process, followed by another one by the Navy on gas centrifuge process in May 
1943.5 As the war situation deteriorated in the summer of 1944, Japan began to devote 
more attention to developing a nuclear weapon, but its efforts were in vain. After the 
war, the U.S. government concluded that Japan only possessed a rudimentary nuclear 
weapons program, roughly equivalent to the state reached by the U.S. nuclear 
weapons program in early 1942.6 Nevertheless, Japanese scientists had determined the 
amount of uranium required for a bomb, calculated the likely yield of a fission device, 
and understood how they might go about triggering a fission reaction.7
 
 
 
 
                                               
4 See the following reference materials for a comprehensive overview of Japan’s examination of 
nuclear option: Akira Kurosaki, Kaku Heiki to Nichibei Kankei (Nuclear Weapons and Japan-US 
Relations) (Yushisha, Tokyo: 2006); and Narushige Michishita, “Kaku Mondai ni kansuru Nihon 
no Ugoki (Japan’s Actions regarding Nuclear Problems),” a briefing material produced as a course 
material of Michishita’s class at the Graduate Research institute of Policy Studies in Tokyo, Japan, 
August 2006. 
5 Hiroki Sugita, Kenshou Hikaku no Sentaku (Reviewing Japan’s Decision to Pursue Non-Nuclear 
Weapon State) (Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo: 2005), p. 13-17. 
6 Sugita, Kenshou Hikaku no Sentaku, p. 19. 
7 Ibid. pp. 19-20. 
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The 1950s 
As the Cold War deepened in the 1950s, the U.S. military began to encourage 
Japan to prepare for nuclear warfare, to which Japan responded honestly. Tokyo’s 
response was driven by increasing anxiety about potential nuclear attack from the 
Soviet Union and the possibility that China might test a nuclear weapon. At that time, 
Japanese military investigated nuclear option somewhat openly, including its tactical 
use. The 1950s were unique in the sense that statements about Japan’s nuclear options 
appeared in the press relatively openly, reflecting Japan’s increasing concern over the 
Soviet nuclear attack and U.S. encouragement to take the problem seriously.8
As the United States began to encourage Japan’s remilitarization in the mid-
1950s, Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) initiated research on protection measures 
in the event of nuclear attack.
 Japan’s 
interest in nuclear weapon was a product of the U.S. Eisenhower administration’s 
encouragement. Advice from French high-ranking political figures on the merit of 
nuclear weapon state also prompted Japanese policymakers to examine a nuclear 
option.  
 9 In March 1955, Japanese Prime Minister Ichiro 
Hatoyama stated: “There is no reason to oppose to the (idea of) U.S. storage of 
nuclear weapons in Japan if (military) power contributes to the preservation of peace 
justifiably.”10 He repeated a similar statement in July. Starting in 1956, the U.S. Army 
Command and General Staff College began to accept colonels from Japan’s Ground 
SDF (GSDF) as overseas students.  These officers were taught U.S. doctrine about 
nuclear operations.11 In February 1957, Japan’s defense minister confirmed in the 
Diet session that the government had initiated an assessment of the potential damage 
Japan might suffer in the event of nuclear attack. By the late 1950s, Japan also began 
to procure combat tanks and vessels that offered some protection (e.g., self-contained 
oxygen systems) and decontamination equipment in the battlefield of nuclear 
warfare.12
There also are indications that during the 1950s, the Japanese GSDF 
undertook studies on the use of nuclear weapons against Soviet Union.
 
13 In May 
1957, Japanese Prime Minister Shinsuke Kishi stated, “The Japanese Constitution 
does not rule out Japan’s possession of nuclear weapons for self-defense.”14 In 
November 1958, during a visit to the United States, Lieutenant General Kumao Imoto 
stated that Japan would fare better by possessing nuclear weapons against an enemy 
equipped with nuclear weapons.15 In May 1959, Japanese Defense Minister Hanjiro 
Inou, suggested that Japan might possess nuclear-armed missiles in the future.16 In 
July 1959 Munenori Akagi (who later became defense minister) revealed a draft of 
the second defense buildup program, which assumed deployment of missiles capable 
for both conventional and nuclear-warheads.17
However, these examinations over nuclear options were constrained by the 
public’s allergy against nuclear weapons, which became profound when the members 
 
                                               
8 Ibid. pp. 47-48. 
9 Ibid. pp. 46-47. 
10 Ibid. p. 47. 
11 Ibid. pp. 42-47. 
12 Sugita, Kenshou Hikaku no Sentaku, pp. 46-47. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. p. 47. 
15 Ibid 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
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of a fishing ship, Daigo Fukuryumaru (Lucky Dragon), were exposed to radiation 
during their operation near the U.S. nuclear testing site on Marshall Island March 
1954. The Japanese public was appalled because this incident rekindled memories of 
the 1945 U.S. nuclear attacks on Japan.18
Despite such public sensitivity, in December 1954, the Eisenhower 
administration approved the transfer of non-nuclear components of nuclear arsenal to 
U.S. bases in Japan.
  
19 Japan was to be used for nuclear operations against Soviet 
Union or China in the event of war.20 During the late 1950s, the Pentagon hoped to 
cure the Japanese of their “nuclear allergy” so that they would accept ongoing nuclear 
weapon storage in Japan,21 although there were dissenting views to such an idea 
within the U.S. Department of State.22 Eventually, about 800 nuclear warheads were 
located at Kadena airbase by the end of the Eisenhower administration.23 In August 
1955, the United States also deployed MGR-1, or Honest John, the U.S. rocket system 
capable of carrying nuclear warheads, to U.S. military base in Asaka in Saitama 
Prefecture, close to Tokyo, although U.S. military, claimed that they were not 
equipped with nuclear warheads.24
In addition, in January 1957, the U.S. media reported that the United States 
planned on deploying land units armed with tactical nuclear weapon to Japan. Martin 
E. Weinstein, who became a special advisor to the U.S. ambassador to Japan from 
1975-1977, admitted that the Eisenhower administration had planned to introduce 
nuclear missiles to Japan as part of its New Look national security policy.
  
25 The 
Hatoyama government was concerned about public opposition to the deployments, 
and agreed only to introduce the rocket system without nuclear warheads.26
In April 1957, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) produced a report 
stating that there was a chance that the Japanese public’s opposition to nuclear 
weapons might recede in the coming years and that they might accept nuclear 
weapons for defensive purpose if they became convinced a Japanese nuclear 
capability would bolster deterrence and stability in Asia.
 Nuclear 
weapons were to be brought into Japan only if the global security situation 
deteriorated.  
27 In February 1959, another 
U.S. DOD report stated that Japan might approve U.S. nuclear operations against the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) from U.S. military bases in Japan if the Japanese 
government believed that Beijing might possibly use nuclear weapons against 
Japan.28
                                               
18 Ibid. p. 53. 
19 Robert S. Norris, William M. Arkin, and William Burr, “Where They Were”, The Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, November/December 1999, p. 30. 
20 Peter Hayes et al., American Lake, Nuclear Peril in the Pacific (New York: Penguin Books, 
1986), p. 76. 
21 Norris, Arkin, and Burr, “Where They Were”, p. 31. 
22 Shinichi Kitaoka, “Anzen Hoshou no Taibei Izon ga Umidashita ‘Mitsuyaku’ no Jitsuzo (The 
Reality of ‘Japan-U.S. Secret Agreement’ That Was Produced as a Result of Japan’s Dependence 
on the United States for National Security Affairs)”, Chuo Koron, May 2010, p. 143. 
23 Sugita, Kenshou Hikaku no Sentaku, pp. 60-61. 
24 Ibid. p. 61. 
 In December 1957, Frank C. Nash, a special advisor to President Eisenhower 
recommended to the President that the U.S. military should train the SDF in the use of 
25 Martin E. Weinstein, Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, 1947-1968 (Columbia University Press: 
1971), cited in Sugita, Kenshou Hikaku no Sentaku, p. 61. 
26 Weinstein, Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, 1947-1968, cited in Sugita, p. 61. 
27 Japanese translation cited in Sugita, Kenshou Hikaku no Sentaku, p. 65. 
28 Ibid. 
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nuclear weapon so that the SDF could use them during war.29 Nash also 
recommended that the United States should educate key Japanese figures about the 
types and capabilities of nuclear weapons appropriate for Japan. In 1957, the U.S. 
government also predicted that there was an “even” chance that the Japanese would 
acquire their own nuclear bomb by 1967.30 In a joint meeting between the U.S. DOS 
and DOD on September 9, 1957, Douglas MacArthur, Jr., then U.S. ambassador to 
Japan, stated that Japan planned its defense policy on the assumption that it would 
have nuclear weapons by 1965.31
The 1960s 
 The Eisenhower administration seems to have been 
concerned more about the communism threats from the Soviet Union and the PRC 
than the threat of nuclear proliferation.  
 
 
Although the following John F. Kennedy administration eventually considered 
nuclear proliferation to be a serious issue, the U.S. government’s historical records 
indicate that it continued to view the potential of a nuclear armed Japan with 
equanimity. In February 1961, the U.S. Air Force recommended a nuclear-sharing 
program with U.S. allies in Asia to counter a nuclear-armed China.32 In December 
1962, the Far Eastern Bureau of the U.S. State Department noted that U.S. military 
assistance to Japan was intended to prepare the country to possess nuclear weapons 
under the NATO-type safeguards.33 The U.S. military was prepared to launch nuclear 
attacks from Japan's main islands in the 1960s in the event of a crisis in the region, 
according to State Department documents.34 In fact, Paul Carpenter, a former U.S. 
military officer, stated in his interview with a Japanese journalist that he had actually 
handled MK7 and MK28, nuclear bombs, even those in an operationally-ready status, 
during his assignment to Kadena airbase in Japan from 1957 to 1963.35
In November 1961, Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda expressed his interest in 
acquiring a nuclear capability during his meeting with Secretary of State Dean 
Rusk.
  
36 Ikeda seems to have been originally interested in the idea to acquire nuclear 
weapons from the United States with the expectation that it might contribute to 
reducing the Japan’s defense budget.37
                                               
29 Ibid. pp. 61-62. 
 Additionally, according to former Prime 
Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, Ikeda stated to him, “I met with French President 
(Charles André Joseph Pierre-Marie) de Gaulle in Paris and have come to believe that 
Japan has to arm itself with nuclear weapon”. According to Nakasone, Ikeda was 
probably shamed by de Gaulle for Japan’s reliance upon U.S. on its national security 
30  National Intelligence Estimate 100-6-57, "Nuclear Weapons Production in Fourth Countries - 
Likelihood and Consequences," June 18, 1957, in the National Security Archive, “National 
Intelligence Estimates of the Nuclear Proliferation Problem The First Ten Years, 1957-1967”, 
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 155, June 1, 2005, 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB155/index.htm, accessed 30 May 2008. 
31 Japanese translation cited in Sugita, Kenshou Hikaku no Sentaku, pp. 56-57. 
32 Sugita, Kenshou Hikaku no Sentaku, p. 65. 
33 Ibid. pp. 64-65. 
34 “U.S. planned atomic attacks from Japan”, The Japan Times, May 9, 2000. 
35 Sugita, Kenshou Hikaku no Sentaku, pp. 63-64. 
36 Memcon, Ikead and Rusk, November 3, 1961, FRUS 1961-1963, Vol. 22, Northeast Asia, 1996, 
p. 711, cited in Kurosaki, Kakuheiki to Nichibei Kankei, p. 42. 
37 Kurosaki, Kakuheiki to Nichibei Kankei, p. 42. 
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affairs.38 Also, in Ikeda’s private conversation with Masaya Ito, then-secretary to 
Ikeda, Ikeda explicitly stated, “Japan also has to arm itself with nuclear weapon”, 
prompted by the West Germany’s discussion over defense policy.39
In 1963, Japan’s Joint Staff Council conducted a classified desk-top 
simulation exercise (now known as “Mitsuya Study”) together with the 
representatives from the U.S. military forces in Japan, over a scenario of an outbreak 
of Second Korean War. They concluded that the use of strategic nuclear weapons 
should be avoided as much as possible to prevent the crisis from escalating into an all-
out war between the United States and Soviet Union and that the first use of strategic 
nuclear weapon must be avoided by any means. They also concluded that the first use 
of tactical nuclear weapons should be avoided as much as possible, but recommended 
the limited use of tactical nuclear weapons against adversary’s missile bases and 
landing enemy troops in retaliation for the adversary’s nuclear attack. This was a joint 
study of the nuclear war by Japan and the United States.
 
40
Nuclear nonproliferation became a higher priority for the Lyndon B. Johnson 
administration, which no longer welcomed active allied consideration of the nuclear 
option. However, it took some time for the Japanese political leaders to adapt to this 
change. After China conducted its first nuclear weapon test in 1964, Prime Minister 
Sato stated in his discussion with U.S. Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer that if an 
adversary had nuclear weapons, it would be a common sense that Japan also had 
nuclear weapons.
 When information about 
this study was leaked to media, however, Prime Minister Sato was forced to 
apologize. Henceforth, the SDF and government officials refrained from studying 
about nuclear warfare, except for the issues related to protection against nuclear 
attack. 
41 At Japan-U.S. summit in January 1965, Sato explicitly told 
President Johnson, “...if Chicoms [Chinese Communists] had nuclear weapons, the 
Japanese also should have them.”42 Johnson replied that the United States would keep 
its promise and provide nuclear deterrence in Japan’s defense. Sato said that this was 
exactly what he expected to hear from the U.S. president.43
After China succeeded in nuclear missile test in 1966, Pierre Marie Gallois, 
a 
 
French Air Force Brigade General and an architect of French nuclear strategy, 
advised Japan to possess nuclear weapons in order to become neutral diplomatically 
and avoid involvement in war against nuclear China. General Gallois was popular 
                                               
38 “Kaku wo Ou, Kenshou Nihon no Seisaku:  Jou: Nihon ‘Hikaku’ ni Jirenma (Tracking the 
Nukes: Reviewing Japan’s Policy, Part I. Japan’s Non-Nuclear Posture Faced with Dilemma)”, 
Asahi Shimbun, August 1, 2007.  
39  Masaya Ito, Ikeda Hayato to Sono Jidai (Hayato Ikeda and the Epoch) (Asahi Shimbunsha, 
1985), p. 234. 
40 Sugita, Kenshou Hikaku no Sentaku, pp. 66-67. 
41 Embtel 2067, Tokyo to SecState, December 29, 1964, NSA, No. 400; and Miki Kase, 
Daitouryou ate Nihonkoku Shushou no Gokuhi Fairu (Secret Files for the US Presidents 
Concerning the Japanese Prime Ministers) (Mainichi Shimbunsha, Tokyo: 1999) , p. 24. 
42 Central Foreign Policy Files, “Your Meeting with Prime Minister Sato”, memorandum for the 
president from the secretary of state, secret, January 9, 1965, box 2376, RG 59, National Archives, 
College Park, Md, cited in Kurt M. Campbell and Tsuyoshi Sunohara, “Japan: Thinking the 
Unthinkable”, in Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, The Nuclear 
Tipping Point (Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C.: 2004), p. 222. 
43  “Kaku wo Ou, Kenshou Nihon no Seisaku:  Jou: Nihon ‘Hikaku’ ni Jirenma (Tracking the 
Nukes: Reviewing Japan’s Policy, Part I. Japan’s Non-Nuclear Posture Faced with Dilemma)”, 
Asahi Shimbun, August 1, 2007. 
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among Japanese conservative.44
Prior to signing the NPT in 1970, there were concerns in Japan that the 
NPT might determine a country’s rank in the international position based upon the 
criteria of whether or not it had nuclear weapon. In February 1966, reportedly, then-
Vice Foreign Minister Takeso Shimoda stated, “non-nuclear weapon states, such as 
Japan, should press major countries on nuclear disarmament”, and that “the non-
nuclear weapon states should not wish to be covered by the nuclear umbrella of other 
countries or ask for their pity for the sake of national security.”
 Suggestions or advice from French senior figures 
were instrumental in prompting some Japanese key leaders to examine Japan’s 
nuclear option.  
45  (Shimoda later went 
so far as to invoke controversy in December 1967 by stating: “It is impossible to 
predict the future of [nuclear-armed] China precisely.  I think that the final choice of 
whether or not Japan may become a nuclear weapon state should be left in the hand of 
Japan’s future generation.”46) Also, in December 1966, then-senior official of the 
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) Nobuhiko Ushiba stated in his 
discussion with then-U.S. Undersecretary of State Nicolas deB Katzenbach that it 
would be regrettable if a country’s rank could be determined by whether or not it had 
nuclear weapons by signing the NPT, although he stated that Japan did not intend to 
develop one.47
It was within this context when Prime Minister Sato announced the so-
called Three Non-nuclear Principles during the Diet session in December 1967. 
Originally, however, the announcement of these three Principles was not what Sato 
originally intended. Prior to the Diet session, Sato had initially drafted his speech in 
order to announce only Japan’s policy to refrain from manufacturing and possessing 
nuclear weapons, effectively only Two Non-nuclear Principles.
 
48 However, the draft 
was revised later to prohibit Japan even from permitting the entry of nuclear weapons 
into the country or in its air or sea space, due to the strong demands from the ruling 
Liberal Democratic Party and some of his Cabinet members.49 For Sato, at that time, 
the return of the Okinawa islands, which were then occupied and administered by the 
U.S., was a top priority agenda. He was concerned that the introduction of the Three 
Non-nuclear Principles would harden U.S. negotiation posture over the return of 
Okinawa since the U.S. clearly wanted to deploy nuclear weapons to the Okinawa 
islands even after their return to Japan. Sato was critical to the position to impose any 
restriction on U.S. deployment of nuclear weapons to the Okinawa islands.50
Concerned about the course of Japan’s negotiation with the United States 
on the Okinawa islands, Sato decided to introduce the Four Nuclear Policies in 
  
                                               
44 Sugita, Kenshou Hikaku no Sentaku, p. 68. 
45 Asahi Shimbun, February 18, 1966, cited in Akira Kurosaki, Kakuheiki to Nichibei Kankei 
(Nuclear Weapons and Japan-US Relations) (Yushisha, Tokyo: 2006), p. 196. 
46 Asahi Shimbun, December 2, 1967, cited in Akira Kurosaki, Kakuheiki to Nichibei Kankei 
(Nuclear Weapons and Japan-US Relations) (Yushisha, Tokyo: 2006), p. 229. 
47 Memcon, Ushiba and Katzenbach, December 2, 1966, POL JAPAN-US, 1/1/66, Box 2383, CF, 
RG59, NA, cited in Akira Kurosaki, Kakuheiki to Nichibei Kankei (Nuclear Weapons and Japan-
US Relations) (Yushisha, Tokyo: 2006), pp. 80-81. 
48 Akira Kurosaki, Kakuheiki to Nichibei Kankei (Nuclear Weapons and Japan-US Relations) 
(Yushisha, Tokyo: 2006), p. 210. 
49 Akihiko Tanaka, Anzen Hoshou (National Security) (Yomiuri Shimbunsha, Tokyo: 1997), p. 
222. 
50 Record of the 58th session of the Budget Committee of the Upper House of the Diet, March 25, 
1968, p. 21, cited in Akira Kurosaki, Kakuheiki to Nichibei Kankei (Nuclear Weapons and Japan-
US Relations) (Yushisha, Tokyo: 2006), p. 210. 
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January 1968, which explicitly positioned Japan’s reliance upon U.S. extended 
deterrence as a declaratory policy, for the first time. Sato had originally intended to 
emphasize that the Three Non-nuclear Principles could be sustained only in 
conjunction with the other three Nuclear Policies.  Such explicit statement was 
deleted eventually, however, because strong domestic support for the Three Non-
nuclear Principles emerged unexpectedly.51 Frustrated with such domestic 
environment, Sato explicitly stated in his discussion with then-U.S. Ambassador to 
Japan U. Alexis Johnson in January 1969 that the Three Non-nuclear Principles were 
“nonsense,” lamenting the lack of Japanese public understanding of national defense 
issues.52
On the U.S. part, however, by 1965, the Pentagon officials decided that the 
Japanese “nuclear allergy” was too difficult to cure, and removed non-nuclear bomb 
components from Japan in the mid 1960s. In 1967 at the height of the intensity of the 
Vietnam War, the U.S. military stored approximately 1,300 nuclear weapons in 
Okinawa, but they were removed by June 1972.
 Eventually, in November 1969, a secret deal was concluded between Sato 
and U.S. President Richard M. Nixon to return the Okinawa islands to Japan on the 
condition that Japan would not oppose to U.S. introduction of nuclear weapons to 
these islands without prior consultation with Japan. 
53 However, it was regarded as vital 
for the U.S. military to be able to deploy nuclear weapons to Japan at a time of 
crisis.54
Thinking about the Nuclear Option: The Emergence of Policy Studies 
 
In Japan, on the other hand, from late 1960s through early 1970s, a few 
informal study groups were formed to examine Japan’s nuclear option, which 
produced detailed reports resembling to those that appeared after the 1990s.  
 
 
In the late 1960s, a private study group, Research Commission on National 
Security (Anzen Hoshou Chousa Kai) was formed, which was led by Osamu Kaibara, 
then Director General of the National Defense Council (Kokubou Kaigi). The study 
group concluded that a plutonium-based atomic bomb could be produced more easily 
than uranium-based weapon, that the graphite-moderated reactor in Tokaimura was 
suited for the production of weapon-grade plutonium, and that the submarine would 
be the most appropriate launch platform for a nuclear-tipped missile.55
                                               
51 Kei Wakaizumi, Tasaku Nakarishi wo Shinzemu to Hossu (Believing that There Was No Other 
Option Available) (Bungei Shunju, Tokyo: 1994), pp. 140-141. 
52“Hikaku 3 Gensoku ha Nansensu [The Three Non-nuclear Principles Are Nonsense],” Kyodo 
News, June 10, 2000. 
53 Norris, Arkin, and Burr, “Where They Were”, 30-31; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Iwayuru 
‘Mitsuyaku’ Mondai ni kansuru Yuushikisha Iinkai Houkokusho (A Report by the Expert 
Committee on the So-Called “Japan-U.S. Secret Agreement”), 9 March 2010, p. 18. 
54 For example, in 1969, U. A. Johnson, then Undersecretary of State, stated that it was vital for 
the United States to be able to locate non-strategic nuclear weapons in Okinawa in order to sustain 
nuclear deterrence, during his meeting with Kazuo Aichi, then Japanese Minister of Foreign 
Affairs. See, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Iwayuru ‘Mitsuyaku’ Mondai ni kansuru Yuushikisha 
Iinkai Houkokusho, p. 62. 
55 Research Commission on National Security (Anzen Hoshou Chousa Kai), Nihon no Anzen 
Hoshou 1968 nenban (Japan’s National Security 1968) (Asagumo Shuppansha, Tokyo: 1968), 
cited in Sugita, Kenshou Hikaku no Sentaku, pp. 67-70. 
 The report 
explained the mechanism of uranium enrichment and plutonium production, and 
concluded that Japan could produce 200-300 atomic bombs from indigenous natural 
uranium and that the nuclear reactor in Tokaimura could produce weapon-grade 
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plutonium in the amount of 20 atomic bombs per year. This report also carried a list 
of the Japanese companies and research institutions that had the necessary 
technologies for producing atomic bombs. While some conclusions in this report seem 
questionable, this report attempted a comprehensive analysis of Japan’s nuclear 
capabilities, including the production of nuclear warhead, hydrogen bomb, and 
delivery vehicles, as well as nuclear complex.56 The study group, however, voiced its 
opposition to a nuclear weapons program because of huge production costs and 
significant political impact on neighboring countries. The group concluded that the 
best option for Japan was to rely upon U.S. nuclear deterrence rather than being 
feared by the international community.57
From 1967 until 1970, the Cabinet’s Office of Research (COR) (Naikaku 
Chousashitsu) also secretly established a project called “The Study Group on 
Democracy,” to examine if it was possible and desirable for Japan to develop its own 
nuclear force.
 
58 At that time, many Japanese nationalists and conservatives expressed 
support for Japan’s nuclear options, triggered by China’s nuclear testing and the 
international negotiation over the NPT. COR members believed that the government 
should examine Japan’s nuclear options to counter those arguments by the nuclear 
advocates.59 The group concluded that a nuclear weapons program was not desirable 
because it would be too expensive, fail to gain domestic support, and generate 
security dilemma in the region.60 It concluded that Japan could produce a small 
number of plutonium-based atomic bombs, but that it would find it difficult to 
establish a reliable nuclear force.61 The plutonium stored at the Tokaimura facilities 
was subject to IAEA inspection and could not be diverted for military use. Also, 
Japan did not have a reprocessing plant to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel at 
that time. The group noted that more than 50 percent of Japan’s population and most 
industrial centers were concentrated in only 18.9 percent areas of Japan’s territories, 
making Japan very vulnerable to nuclear attack. The COR group concluded an 
indigenous nuclear weapon would not contribute to deterrence.62 They also stated that 
the possession of nuclear weapon was no longer a necessary condition to be a major 
power, and that Japan must solve security problems from a completely new viewpoint 
incorporating multiple perspectives.63
The Gaikou Seisaku Kikaku Iinkai (Foreign Policy Planning Committee) of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) also conducted an inquiry into Japan’s nuclear 
future. In 1969, the MOFA gathered “the best and the brightest” above the division-
director level, and produced an internal document, “Waga Kuni no Gaiko Seisaku 
Taiko (Guidelines of Japan’s Foreign Policy).” They also concluded that Japan should 
sustain the policy not to possess nuclear weapon at least for the time being, but that it 
  
                                               
56 In 1981, a politician of the opposition party obtained a copy of the report on Japan’s nuclear 
capabilities produced by the Research Commission on National Security (Anzen Hoshou Chousa 
Kai). Some of the contents of this report were introduced during the session of the Diet’s Upper 
House Committee on the Settlement of Account, on March 30 in 1981. See, Kessan Iinkai 
Kaigiroku Daigogou (The Record of the Meeting of the Committee on the Settlement of Account, 
No. 5), 30 March 1981. 
57 Sugita, Kenshou Hikaku no Sentaku, pp. 68-70. 
58“Kakubuso Kano daga Motenu [Nuclear Armament Technically Possible, but Not 
Recommendable],” Asahi Shimbun, November 13, 1994. 
59 Sugita, Kenshou Hikaku no Sentaku, pp. 70-71. 
60 Ibid. 71-72. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
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was necessary to develop latent nuclear capability.64 The report stressed that it was 
necessary to have the potential capabilities, economically and technically, to produce 
nuclear weapons and to avoid any damage to such latent capabilities.65 They also 
stated that it was important to undertake a campaign to educate the public that the 
decision on nuclear weapons policy should be made by strategic (not ideological or 
emotional) calculations of the merits and demerits under the international 
environment. It stressed that the Japanese government should make every effort to 
avoid domestic panic acrimony even if the United States should decide to locate non-
strategic nuclear weapons in Japan in the event of war.66
In 1970, Defense Minister Yasuhiro Nanasone (who became prime minister in 
the 1980s) also ordered a group of experts to examine what it would take for Japan to 
arm itself with nuclear weapon. The group concluded that it would take five years at 
maximum and an investment of 200 billion yen, which was about equal to 40 percent 
of the FY 1970 defense budget. According to Nakasone, the lack of a nuclear testing 
site in Japan was perceived to be a major hurdle.
 
67 Eventually, the Japanese Defense 
White Paper commissioned by Nakasone stated: “as for defensive nuclear weapons, it 
would be possible in a legal sense to possess small-yield, tactical, purely defensive 
nuclear weapons without violating the Constitution. In view of the danger of inviting 
adverse foreign reactions and large-scale war, we will follow the policy of not 
acquiring nuclear weapons at present.”68
Japan signed the NPT in 1970, but its ratification was delayed until 1976, 
which was interpreted by the U.S. as an indication of Japan’s hidden aspiration for 
nuclear armament. In fact, the Japanese government was concerned at that time about 
securing equal treatment over the IAEA safeguards vis-à-vis the European Atomic 
Energy Community (EURATOM).
 
In sum, the nuclear policy reviews and studies undertaken prior to the 1970s 
generally found that Japan could potentially build a nuclear arsenal, but that the 
strategic benefits did not outweigh the economic and political costs of an indigenous 
nuclear option. These studies highlighted the core tenets of Japan’s “Four Nuclear 
Policies” that remain in place today. However, Japan decided to possess an advanced 
nuclear infrastructure that is often described as a latent nuclear capability. 
 
 
Hesitation over the NPT 
69
                                               
64 Mainichi Shimbun Shakaibu ed., Usagi no Mimi to Hato no Yume: Nihon no Kaku to Jouhou 
Senryaku (Rabbit’s Ear and Dove’s Dream: Japan’s Nuclear and Information Strategy) (Liberta 
Shuppan, Tokyo: 1995); and Kurosaki, Kaku Heiki to Nichibei Kankei, p. 278. 
65 Mainichi Shimbun Shakaibu ed., Usagi no Mimi to Hato no Yume: Nihon no Kaku to Jouhou 
Senryaku (Rabbit’s Ears and Dove’s Dream: Japan’s Nuclear and Information Strategy) (Liberta 
Shuppan, Tokyo: 1995); and Akira Kurosaki, Kaku Heiki to Nichibei Kankei (Nuclear Weapons 
and Japan-US Relations) (Yushisha, Tokyo: 2006), p. 278. 
66 Sugita, Kenshou Hikaku no Sentaku, p. 76. 
67 Yasuhiro Nakasone, Jiseiroku (Record of Reflection) (Shinchosha, Tokyo: 2004), pp. 224-225. 
68 “Gist of White Paper on Defense”, Japan Times, October 1970, p. 20, cited in Campbell and 
Sunohara, “Japan: Thinking the Unthinkable”, p. 222. 
69 Akira Kurosaki, Kaku Heiki to Nichibei Kankei (Nuclear Weapons and Japan-US Relations) 
(Yushisha, Tokyo: 2006), pp. 247-248. 
 The Japanese government was pressured by the 
domestic industry and politicians to pursue IAEA safeguards which could be 
equivalent to the one with EURATOM so that Japan alone would not be left in an 
unequal position. As such, Japan was waiting for the conclusions of the safeguards 
agreements between IAEA and the member states of the EURATOM which were 
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completed in 1973. Even after this development, however, it took another three years 
for Japan to ratify the treaty because of the remaining domestic concern that the treaty 
might pose considerable constraints on Japan’s use of nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes. The political efforts to forge domestic consensus as the issue was further 
complicated by the changes of administrations.70
In order to sooth down Japan’s concern over the “second-rank” status by 
signing the NPT and to guide Japan to holding on to the non-nuclear status, the U.S. 
administration in the 1960s decided to assist Japan with space development, hoping 
that space exploration would fill in Japan’s desire for a “first-rank” country.
   
71
U.S. Extended Deterrence and Latent Nuclear Capability 
 Even 
so, the U.S. was continuously concerned about the prospect of Japan’s nuclear 
armament in the 1970s. Although Japan ratified the NPT in 1976 eventually, Japan 
initiated operation of plutonium reprocessing facilities in Tokaimura in 1977, which 
added U.S. concern. 
 
 
Japan’s reliance upon U.S. extended deterrence was clearly articulated in 
Japan’s defense strategy. In October 1976, the Outline of Defense Planning (Bouei 
Keikaku Taikou) stated, “Japan relies upon U.S. nuclear deterrence against nuclear 
threats.”72 The decision to rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella was made in tandem with 
the strategic calculation to maintain a latent nuclear capability. In the 1970s, Takuya 
Kubo, then Bureau Director of Defese Policy of Japan Defence Agency, wrote a 
famous article, KB Ronbun (An Article Written by KB), which stated: “…if Japan 
prepares latent nuclear capability that would enable Japan to develop significant 
nuclear armament at anytime…the United States would hope to sustain the Japan-U.S. 
security system by providing a nuclear guarantee to Japan, because otherwise, the 
United States would be afraid of a rapid deterioration of the stability “...in the 
international relations triggered by nuclear proliferation.”73
The possibility of Japan’s nuclear option attracted attention of the U.S. 
government continuously. Since late 1950s, the U.S. government was certainly kept 
 
These records indicate that during the Cold War, Japanese policymakers 
clearly recognized the strategic utility in holding latent nuclear capability since the 
1960s. This latent nuclear capability was expected to address any potential uncertainty 
surrounding the U.S. commitment to provide extended deterrence to Japan, in Kubo’s 
view. Should the United States become reluctant about reassurance, Japan’s latent 
nuclear capability was expected, at least theoretically, to remind the United States 
about Japan’s indigenous nuclear option. Also, there may have been expectation 
among the Japanese policymakers that such latent capabilities could supplement U.S. 
nuclear deterrence.   
On the other hand, Japan’s atomic energy policy was also affected by another 
serious concern over the unstable oil supply from the Middle East, after the oil price 
shocks in 1973. Japan’s pursuit of nuclear fuel cycle was motivated strongly by the 
requirement for energy security as well.  
                                               
70 Akira Kurosaki, Kaku Heiki to Nichibei Kankei (Nuclear Weapons and Japan-US Relations) 
(Yushisha, Tokyo: 2006), pp. 248-260. 
71 Kurosaki, Kakuheiki to Nichibei Kankei, pp. 108-146. 
72 Asahi Shimbun, October 29, 1976, cited in Kurosaki, Kakuheiki to Nichibei Kankei, p. 214. 
73 Takuya Kubo, “Boueiryoku Seibi no Kangaekata (A Framework to Consider the Arrangement 
of Japan’s Defense Capabilities)”, February 20, 1971, http://www.ioc.u-
tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPSC/19710220.O1J.html, accessed 30 April 2008. 
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concerned about the prospect for Japan’s nuclear armament constantly.  Below is a list 
of some of the examples of the U.S. estimates: 
・ In 1961, Japan, along with Sweden, Israel, France, West 
Germany, India, and other were categorized as the “likely 
group” to develop nuclear weapons.74
・ Similarly, in1964, the so-called “Thompson Committee” 
was established under the Committee of Principals at the 
direction of then-Secretary of State Dean Rusk in order to 
make recommendation to the U.S. government to stop the 
horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.  The 
Thompson Committee analysed in June 1965 that Japan 
would be able to conduct the first nuclear test by 1971, to 
produce about 10-30 nuclear weapons annually after the 
test, and to produce about 100 nuclear-tipped 
MRBM/IRBM by 1975.
  It was estimated that 
Japan could also go nuclear in the wake of a Chinese test or 
if it lost confidence in U.S. security guarantees.  
75
・ In the National Intelligence Estimate of 1967, Japan was 
deemed one of the “serious candidates” for acquiring 
nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems.
  
76
・ Also, reportedly, in July 1971, U.S. Secretary of Defence 
Melvin R. Laird commented that Japan might be able to 
develop and possess its own nuclear force in the 1980s.
 
77
 
 
Strengthening Japan-U.S. Alliance 
 
In the early 1980s, Ronald Reagan strengthened the Japan-U.S. alliance by 
deepening U.S. presence in the Asia Pacific region. In the 1980s, Japanese officials 
became less concerned about the “decoupling effect” produced by the Soviet-
American nuclear confrontation. As Matake Kamiya points out, during this period, 
Japan’s defense posture was predicated on the notion that if Japan was subjected to a 
Soviet nuclear attack, the strike would be undertaken in the context of a global 
                                               
74 National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 4-3-61, "Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Capabilities of 
Free World Countries Other than the US and UK," September 21, 1961, Secret, Excised copy, 
(Source: microfiche supplement to U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United 
States, 1961-1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament (Washington, D.C., U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1997)), posted on the website of the National Security Archive, 
“National Intelligence Estimates of the Nuclear Proliferation Problem The First Ten Years, 1957-
1967”, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 155, June 1, 2005. 
75 Memo, Foster to the Member of the Committee of Principals, June 25, 1965, DEF (14-A), 
Thompson Committee, Box 11, PMDA, 1961-1966, Lot Files, RG59, NA; and Paper, “Annex B: 
Economic Factors,” ibid.  Both documents were cited in Akira Kurosaki, Kaku Heiki to Nichibei 
Kankei (Nuclear Weapons and Japan-US Relations) (Yushisha, Tokyo: 2006), p. 61. 
76 NIE 4-67, "Proliferation of Missile Delivery Systems for Nuclear Weapons," 26 January 1967, 
secret, excised copy, as released under appeal, March 2005 (Source: Lyndon B. Johnson Library, 
National Security Files, National Intelligence Estimates, box 1, 4 Arms and Disarmament), posted 
on the website of the National Security Archive, “National Intelligence Estimates of the Nuclear 
Proliferation Problem The First Ten Years, 1957-1967”, National Security Archive Electronic 
Briefing Book No. 155, June 1, 2005. 
77 Asahi Shimbun, July 9, 1971, cited in Akira Kurosaki, Kaku Heiki to Nichibei Kankei (Nuclear 
Weapons and Japan-US Relations) (Yushisha, Tokyo: 2006), pp. 237-238. 
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nuclear war between the United States and the USSR.78
 
 Under these circumstances, 
the United States would probably be subjected to a nuclear attack as well. It was 
unlikely that Japan alone would face such a nuclear attack.  
Nevertheless, Japanese policymakers reminded U.S. officials about its latent 
nuclear capability as the United States began negotiations on the movement of Soviet 
SS-20 missiles from the European theater to the Russian Far East as part of the 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The U.S. and the USSR negotiators 
were alerted by some Japanese experts’ argument for a nuclear option if the USSR 
SS-20 should be transported to the vicinity of Japan, according to a senior U.S. 
negotiator. Eventually, the United States and the USSR eventually agreed on the 
“zero-option.” Namely, the U.S. removed all NATO’s INF and, in return, the USSR 
also removed all SS-20s without transporting them to Far East. 
 
Changing Security Environment in the Twenty-First Century and New Debate 
on Nuclear Option 
 
The Debate on a Nuclear Option after the End of the Cold War 
After the Cold War, in Japan’s conception, the risk of military confrontation 
among the states in Northeast Asia has become salient, especially in light of the 
development of North Korean nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles and the 
increasing tempo of Chinese military modernization with an unclear direction. The 
potential resurgence of Russia’s hegemonic posture is another concern. For Japan, the 
Asian regional security landscape stands in contrast to the situation in Europe where 
the risk of traditional military confrontation among the major powers has decreased 
significantly. The countries and region in the Asian Pacific region strive to forge 
multilateral community while coping with the increasing challenges posed by 
traditional security threats of state conflicts, as well as emerging security challenges, 
such as terrorism, criminal networks, natural disasters and infectious diseases. 
Within this context, in the 1990s, especially driven by the development of 
North Korea’s provocations, reports on Japan’s examination of nuclear options 
surfaced in the media again. In the 1990s, several internal study groups in the 
Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) examined whether Japan’s nuclear option was 
desirable, and reached to the same conclusion with the previous studies. One such 
group concluded in 1995 that a nuclear-weapons program was undesirable because of 
its cost and negative effects, and that there was no strategic merit for Japan to join the 
nuclear arms race. The report suggested that Japan should instead maintain a posture 
of “a proud loser” (Haiboku Shugi) in the nuclear arms race.79
                                               
78 Remarks by Matake Kamiya at a meeting in Japan Institute of International Affairs, May 11, 
2007, Tokyo, Japan.  Also see, Wakatsuki, Zenhoui Gaikou no Jidai; and Shingo Nakajima, Sengo 
Nihon no Bouei Seisaku (Japan’s Defense Policy after the Second World War) (Keio University 
Press, Tokyo: 2006). 
79“Hikaku Power: Haibokushugi Tsuranuki Ginen Harae [Non-nuclear Power: Sustain 
‘Defeatism’ and Expel Skepticism of Other Countries],” Asahi Shimbun, August 4, 1999. 
 Given the steady 
strengthening of the Japan-U.S. alliance, these internal reviews on Japan’s nuclear 
option were rather meant to prove the negatives of nuclear options. 
Even so, however, renewed concern for decoupling has become salient 
increasingly in the minds of Japanese strategic planners. North Korea may not yet 
have the capability to strike the U.S. but already has such capabilities vis-à-vis Japan. 
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China represents the most important strategic challenge to Japan. For Japan, a 
rising China presents a multifaceted character: the largest economic partner; potential 
partner in coping with regional and global affairs; diplomatic rival; and potentially 
grave military threat. China has been advancing an access denial strategy and 
strengthening deterrence vis-à-vis the United States. China has also been 
strengthening its war-fighting capability in the theater, and rapidly improving its naval 
and air power. So far, the United States maintains a military force second to none. 
But, as the United States and Russia advance nuclear disarmament, China may find a 
window of opportunity to achieve some strategic parity with the United States in the 
years ahead. What if China strengthens its capabilities to strike U.S. homeland with 
nukes continuously? Would Washington still be willing to protect Japan even if U.S. 
cities were held at risk by Beijing? 
In this context, concerns have been raised about the credibility of U.S. 
commitment to protect Japan, especially vis-à-vis China. While Japan and the U.S. 
have pursued similar policy to engage China, Japanese policymakers have frequently 
felt that there may be a gap between Japan and the U.S. regarding the degree to which 
each country views China as a subject of deterrence, and are concerned about a 
scenario of encroachment between China and the United States over the head of 
Japan. This comes as a surprise to many U.S. security specialists who find it hard to 
envision a Sino-U.S. relationship so close as to threaten Japanese interests.80 
These concerns have prompted Japan to reshape its strategic thinking in the 
21st
 
 century. Several Japanese political leaders, experts, and commentators have 
initiated open debates on Japan’s nuclear option in this changing security 
environment. 
 
The Debates on Nuclear Option in the 21st
As North Korea escalated its provocative behaviors through the testing of 
nuclear weapons and missiles since 2002, the debate about the nuclear option 
resurfaced in Japan. The Japanese public tolerates this debate, although they do not 
support Japan nuclear option. Such discussion has remained fairly marginal in the 
Japanese media, on contrary to the international concerns over Japan’s nuclear option. 
 
 Century 
Experts and Commentators 
In the February 2003 issue of Shokun!, a conservative opinion journal in 
Japan, for example, Kyorin University Professor Tadae Takubo and Mr. Nagao 
Hyodo, former Japanese Ambassador to Poland, argued that Japan certainly has a 
“nuclear card,” asserting that a principle of “never say never” dominates international 
politics. Japan should never declare that it would never possess nuclear weapons. 
The August 2003 issue of Shokun! also featured a special section on Japan’s 
nuclear options, with participation of forty-five experts and opinion leaders. Kyoto 
University Professor Terumasa Nakanishi, a conservative realist, argued that Japan 
should acquire a nuclear infrastructure that would allow it to acquire nuclear weapons 
on short notice because China would continuously strengthen its power projection 
capabilities while U.S. extended deterrence might become unreliable. According to 
Nakanishi, three scenarios could materialize in the future: (1) The credibility of U.S. 
commitment to the defense of Japan might erode; (2) China might acquire a blue-
                                               
80 Ralph A. Cossa, “Chairman’s Report, U.S.-Japan Strategic Dialogue”, Feb. 25-26, 2008, Maui, 
Hawaii, Pacific Forum CSIS. 
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water navy and establish a permanent naval presence around Okinawa or the Senkaku 
Islands, which are the focal point of territorial disputes between Japan and China; and 
(3) the international community would acquiesce to North Korea’s obvious interest in 
maintaining a nuclear arsenal. Nakanishi framed his argument with more emphasis 
upon the future threat of China than the existing threat from North Korea.81 Nakanishi 
argued that the NPT had begun to demonstrate a major breakdown, and that it became 
less important for the U.S. to protect Japan than during the Cold War, given the 
increasing risk that China and North Korea might threaten to strike U.S. cities with 
nukes. He cited the French decision to protect itself with nuclear weapons during the 
Cold War, and argued that missile defense would not be able to achieve deterrence 
effect equivalent to the one of nuclear weapons. Also he argued that Japan’s nuclear 
armament would constrain China’s aberrant behaviors to challenge Japan’s territorial 
integrity, such as intruding into Japan’s territorial waters and exploring natural 
resources from contested waters, for fear of possible escalation of crisis. Nakanishi 
concluded that it would take several decades, not several years, for Japan to acquire 
credible nuclear force because Japan lacked the basic infrastructure to develop and 
possess nuclear weapons as well as basic instruments such as C4I system and a 
nuclear doctrine, in addition to immature Japan’s national security policy.82
Citing then U.S.Vice President Dick Cheney’s 2003 warning that North 
Korean nuclear threats might cause Japan to develop a nuclear arsenal, Nakanishi and 
other proponents of Japan’s nuclear option mistakenly interpreted such comments of 
senior U.S. senior officials and Cabinet members as a signal of U.S. tacit endorsement 
of Japan’s nuclear option.
 
83 This illusion about the U.S. support for Japan’s nuclear 
option constituted an important assumption of their argument because almost none of 
these pragmatists argued for Japan’s independent nuclear option without the U.S. 
help. Even those proponents acknowledged that approval and cooperation from other 
major nuclear suppliers, especially the U.S., would be essential for Japan’s nuclear 
armament in order to overcome technical difficulties as well as legal and political 
constraints on Japan’s use of nuclear materials for non-civilian purposes.84
In fact, there were widespread views in Japan that the real utility of Japan’s 
discussion of a nuclear option was to send a warning signal to China and North Korea, 
and simultaneously, to pose indirect pressure upon the United States to continue its 
nuclear commitment to protect Japan.
  
85 For example, Terumasa Nakanish argued that 
the debates on Japan’s nuclear option itself could contribute to strengthening nuclear 
deterrence vis-à-vis China and North Korea.86
                                               
81 Terumasa Nakanishi, ed., ‘Nihon Kaku Busou’ no Ronten (Issues of Japan’s Nuclear Armament) 
(PHP Publishing Co., Tokyo: 2006), pp. 14-58. 
82 Terumasa Nakanishi, “Nihonkoku Kakubushou heno Ketsudan [Decision to Arm Japan with 
Nuclear Weapons],” Shokun! August 2003; and Kan Itoh, “No toha Iwanai Amerika [America 
Would Not Say ‘No’ to Japan’s Nuclear Armament’],” Shokun!, August 2003, p. 117. 
83  Nakanishi, “Nihonkoku Kakubushou heno Ketsudan”; and Nakanishi, Nihon Kaku Busou’ no 
Ronten. 
84 Nisohachi Hyodo, “’Nihon Kaku Busou’ no Gutaiteki Sukeju-ru (A Concrete Schedule of 
Japan’s Nuclear Armament)”, in Nakanishi, ed., ‘Nihon Kaku Busou’ no Ronten, pp. 174-176. 
85 Hisahiko Okazaki, “Time to consider a nuclear strategy for Japan”, The Daily Yomiuri, April 8, 
2007.  
86 Terumasa Nakanishi, ed., ‘Nihon Kaku Busou’ no Ronten (Issues of Japan’s Nuclear Armament) 
(PHP Publishing Co., Tokyo: 2006), pp. 56-58 
 Also, former Japanese Ambassador to 
Thailand, Hisahiko Okazaki argued that Japan’s nuclear armament should proceed in 
tandem with the strengthened bilateral alliance with the United States, even if Japan’s 
own nuclear weapons might bring only marginal deterrent effect. In his view, while 
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recognizing that Japan’s nuclear armament under U.S. extended nuclear deterrence 
could be rather redundant from a military perspective, it could have the benefit of 
complicating China’s strategic calculation on the use of nuclear weapons, as French 
nuclear arms did with regard to the Soviet Union during the Cold War.87
Given the lack of strategic depth, many Japanese experts believed that Japan 
would have to pursue sea-based deployment of a nuclear force by acquiring a new 
submarine as a strategic platform. Japan would also need to institute a new naval 
doctrine and train personnel. All these initiatives would take at least a decade to 
complete. Some proponents of nuclear options suggested that nuclear-tipped cruise 
missiles could be deployed on existing destroyers, creating a quicker way to deploy a 
nuclear delivery system,
  
88 but others argued that surface combatants lack the requisite 
survivability as a nuclear delivery system.89 Some in this line of thinking even 
suggested that Japan should develop nuclear weapons for naval use under a closely 
coordinated command with the U.S. military. They argued that Japan should adopt a 
nuclear doctrine similar to the British one, which is centered on coordinated command 
with the U.S., rather than the French model which pursues an independent nuclear 
capability.90
On the other hand, however, occasionally some argued that Japan should 
develop independent nuclear capabilities. Nisohachi Hyodo, a commentator who 
advocates for Japan’s nuclear option, argues that Japan should first develop a crude 
nuclear bomb for a bomber, then a nuclear warhead for a ground-based ballistic 
missile, and finally a nuclear warhead for a cruise missile.
 
91
There is also another view that even if Japan could not possess credible second 
strike capability, its nuclear option might possess a strategic utility by complicating 
the calculation of the adversary who may attempt to drive a wedge between the 
United States and Japan by exploring decoupling effect to threaten Japan but not the 
U.S. Kiyoshi Sugawa, then-senior staff member on national security affairs of the 
Democratic Party of Japan, explained this view in his novel published in 2007.
 However, there does not 
appear to be any elaboration about how such weapon could be employed under what 
type of nuclear doctrine, nor how such nuclear weapons could be integrated into 
Japan’s war-fighting doctrine.  
92
Sporadically, some Japanese politicians urged Japan to create a nuclear 
arsenal, or simply referred to the uncertainty of Japan’s future nuclear posture or the 
 
According to this view, nuclear weapon states, such as the United Kingdom, France, 
Pakistan, and Israel, have decided to possess limited nuclear deterrence even though 
they may not necessarily possess credible second strike capabilities. In this view, 
limited nuclear deterrence would be sufficient since Japan’s primary focus is no 
longer the massive nuclear attacks from the Soviet Union but a far smaller number of 
nuclear weapons of China and North Korea.  
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necessity to discuss Japan’s nuclear option freely, instead of keeping it a taboo. They 
argued that it was rather unhealthy not to discuss Japan’s nuclear option simply 
because of the memory of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In general, however, this remains 
difficult for Japanese politicians to advocate nuclear weapons without risking their 
careers. Careless comments can trigger controversy, leading to political suicide. 
 
 
Politicians  
The October 1999 edition of Playboy Japan ran an interview with then-
Parliamentary Vice Minister of the Japan Defense Agency, Shingo Nishimura. He 
argued that Japan’s failure not to consider the possession of nuclear weapons left the 
nation free for “rape” in the international system. This comment appeared during the 
steady increase in North Korea’s missiles and nuclear capabilities. Nishimura was 
promptly forced to resign.   
Even innocent comments by Cabinet members were easily politicized and 
became quite controversial. In May-June 2002, then-Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary 
Shinzo Abe came under severe criticism for his comment during a speech that the 
Japanese constitution permitted Japan’s possession of nuclear weapons with a range 
limited to that minimally necessary for self-defense.93 Although he simply explained 
the official interpretation of the Constitution, it generated significant political 
controversy. Specifically, in response to a question during a speech at Waseda 
University in Tokyo, Abe stated that the Japanese constitution permits Japan’s 
possession of nuclear weapons with a range limited to that minimally necessary for 
self-defense.94
Subsequently thereafter, in a private conversation a group of journalists asked 
Fukuda about his reaction to Abe’s comment.  After defending Abe’s comments by 
repeating the Japanese government’s traditional interpretation of the Constitution, 
Fukuda reportedly said that nobody would be able to predict the future and that if the 
international security environment should change dramatically, it could be 
conceivable that some citizens might even begin to argue that Japan should possess 
nuclear weapons.
 Abe simply meant to explain the purely legal interpretation of the 
Constitution, which was certainly correct as a legal interpretation of Japan’s 
constitution but proved very inappropriate politically. 
95
Similarly, after North Korea’s nuclear test in October 2006, several politicians 
argued in favour of examining Japan’s nuclear option.  For example, Shoichi 
Nakagawa, the Chairman of the Policy Research Council of the ruling Liberal 
 This was, again, correct from a legal perspective but proved 
politically very inappropriate. Fukuda was severely criticized for his political 
incorrectness and accused of his “hidden militaristic intentions.” 
Following the controversy over Fukuda’s comment on nuclear weapons, 
Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara, one of the most popular conservative politicians in 
Japan, stated that Japan should become ready to produce nuclear weapons if China 
would not stop modernizing its nuclear weapons capabilities. Ishihara’s comment was 
more controversial, but the public was well aware that a Tokyo governor had no 
influence over the national foreign policymaking process. 
                                               
93 “Seikai Gekishin, Abe Shinzo Kanbou Fukuchoukan ga Katatta Monosugoi Nakami, Kaku Heiki 
no Shiyou ha Iken deha nai (Political World Shaken Severely by the Remarks of Deputy Cabinet 
Secretary Shinzo Abe: the Use of Nuclear Weapon Would Not Violate Japan’s Constitution)”, 
Sunday Mainichi, June 2, 2002.  
94 “Ibid.  
95 Mainichi Shimbun, June 1, and 4, 2002. 
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Democratic Party (LDP) and known for his conservative orientation, made public 
remarks on Japan’s nuclear option repeatedly after North Korea’s nuclear testing, 
which made headlines in the world. He continued to repeat this remark despite the 
strong pressures from the other LDP leaders to retract his comments. However, even 
he did not go beyond saying simply that Japan needed open discussions on its nuclear 
option, without articulating his view on the very question he posed. In the end, 
Nakagawa’s comment did not go beyond political rhetorical without any strategic 
framework. He passed away in 2009. 
Foreign Minister Taro Aso (who later became prime minister in 2008) also 
stated that it would be an option for Japan to choose not to have nuclear weapon after 
evaluating the merits of various options. Aso clearly stated his opposition to Japan’s 
nuclear option, especially because of Japan’s geographical vulnerability which lacks 
strategic depth. Even so, he repeatedly argued that such examination to “think the 
unthinkable” would contribute to deepening pragmatic discussion on national security 
affairs, and that it would be rather counter-proactive and dangerous if such discussion 
could be kept a taboo.96
In addition, in July 2007, then-Defence Minister Fumio Kyuma stated, “I 
understand the bombing (in Nagasaki) brought the war to its end. I think it was 
something that couldn't be helped.” He was severely criticised by the public that his 
remarks justified the U.S. atomic bombing of Japan, and three days later, he was 
forced to resign.
 
97
Characteristics of the Debate in the 2000s 
 In the national election in 2009, he lost a Diet seat. 
 
In summary, these debates have revealed several things about contemporary 
discussions on Japan’s nuclear posture. First, a majority of the Japanese public does 
not seem to perceive neighbouring countries’ nuclear weapons as a priority concern in 
their daily life, although a general sense of insecurity increased since the 1990s. Even 
after North Korea’s nuclear testing in October 2006 and May 2009, Japan’s domestic 
reactions to North Korea’s nuclear testing were restrained overall. There was hardly 
any serious discussion to increase Japan’s defence budget.98
                                               
96 Taro Aso, Jiyu to Hanei no Ko (Arc of Freedom and Prosperity: Japan’s Expanding Diplomatic 
Horizons) (Gentosha, Tokyo: 2007), p. 108. 
97 Hiroko Nakata, “Kyuma exits over A-bomb gaffe”, The Japan Times, July 4, 2007. 
98 Hajime Izumi and Katsuhisa Furukawa, “Not Going Nuclear: Japan’s Response to North 
Korea’s Nuclear Test”, Arms Control Today, June 2007. 
 Rather, the reduction of 
the government’s deficits remains a top priority for the government, and the Japanese 
SDFs are obliged to cut back their personnel and procurement. Also, while China 
continuously modernizes its military forces, China became the largest trade partner 
for Japan in 2007. 
Secondly, it is no longer a taboo to discuss nuclear strategy and the 
hypothetical possibility that Japan could require such weapons. Although a nuclear 
option is still unacceptable to the general public, there is recognition that such an 
option could at least be openly discussed. Particularly, the next generation politicians 
and experts are relatively familiar with nuclear strategic issues; though not necessarily 
favor to change Japan’s basic nuclear posture, because many of them graduated from 
international studies programs in the U.S. However, it still remains very difficult and 
controversial for Japanese politicians to advocate nuclear weapons without risking 
his/her career. Careless comments can trigger a huge controversy and may lead to 
political suicide.  
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Third, among the pragmatic thinkers who support examining (though not 
necessarily pursuing) Japan’s nuclear options, many of them favor a strong Japan-
U.S. alliance. Many pragmatists view that North Korea’s military threat could be 
deterred by the combination of U.S. extended deterrence, conventional capabilities, 
and missile defense. Instead, they view a long-term challenges posed by China, rather 
than North Korea, as significant Japan’s strategic challenge.   
 
 
Technical Capabilities  
Nuclear weapon experts abroad have argued that Japan has sufficient technical 
capabilities to produce crude nuclear weapons. Japan has a nuclear fuel-cycle program 
to produce plutonium, although it is reactor-grade plutonium in the form of mixed-
oxide (MOX) for civilian purposes under stringent IAEA inspection. The general 
assessment in the U.S. has been that it would take only one or two years for Japan to 
develop nuclear weapon. 
Japan also has H-IIA and H-IIB rockets, both of which are equipped with 
advanced aerospace engineering capabilities which may be potentially applicable for 
controlling warhead of operational missiles.99 The H-IIB launch vehicle is a two-stage 
rocket using liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen as propellant and has four strap-on 
solid rocket boosters powered by polibutadiene. Their satellite launch systems are 
based on technologies that could be incorporated into a warhead bus theoretically. 
However, there is no indication to suggest that Japan conducted serious conceptual 
efforts to explore requirements for developing ballistic missiles. Michael Elleman, a 
missile expert of Booz Allen Hamilton, pointed out that if Japan were to pursue 
nuclear force, Japan would more likely opt to employ small, highly mobile cruise 
missiles rather than ballistic missiles, given Japan’s limited geographical size and the 
strategic need to field a highly survivable nuclear force structure.100
Reportedly, after North Korea launched ballistic missiles in July 2006, a 
senior Japanese official led an internal assessment of Japan’s capability to produce a 
small nuclear warhead.
 Reportedly, Japan 
seems to have made at least a preliminary inquiry about the cruise missile option, but 
there is no indication for any serious examination subsequently. 
Japan does not yet have the basic instruments and infrastructure that would be 
essential for nuclear weaponry, including a nuclear doctrine, a stringent legal 
framework to protect classified information, a unified C41 system, nor a unified 
intelligence system. In addition, Japan’s nuclear program is strictly constrained by a 
web of domestic regulations and laws as well as bilateral and international treaties. 
101 This internal assessment concluded in September 2006 that 
it would take at least 3 to 5 years for Japan to produce a prototype of small nuclear 
warhead, with the investment of 200 to 300 billion yen (approximately U.S. $1.7-2.5 
billion, assuming an exchange rate of U.S. $1= YEN120) and a few to several 
hundreds of experts and engineers.102
                                               
99 Japan also has the M-V rockets which operate with solid fuel and are capable of placing a 1.8-
ton payload into orbit. However, this rocket system has been privatized, and its government 
funding for research and development has decreased significantly. 
100 Email communication with the author, September 20, 2007. 
101 Hideo Tamura “Kaku Danto Shisaku ni 3nen Ijo (More than 3 Years Are Needed to Produce a 
Prototype of Nuclear Warhead)”, Sankei Shimbun, December 25, 2006. 
102 Ibid. 
  This surprising revelation was reported in 
December 2006, two months after the North Korea’s nuclear test in October.  In fact, 
however, this examination had been already concluded in September prior to North 
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Korea’s nuclear test.  While Prime Minister Abe flatly denied the existence of such 
examination by the Japanese government, Hideo Tamura, an editorial staff member of 
Sankei Shinbun and an author of this news article, is confident about the authenticity 
of this internal government document. According to Tamura, the examination was led 
by a senior official within the government who was in a position to mobilize 
necessary resources and whom Tamura knows well personally. Tamura assumes that 
this examination was possibly made without the knowledge of political leaders, and 
that the document was probably produced so that bureaucrats could respond promptly 
if political leaders should question Japan’s latent nuclear capability.103
Furthermore, Japan would face additional challenges if it were to pursue a 
nuclear option. First, given that only a limited amount of domestic reserve of natural 
uranium exists in Japan, Japan is vulnerable to the embargo of fissile materials. (On 
the contrary, however, there is also a dissenting view as to whether international 
community could impose valid economic sanction against nuclear-armed Japan, one 
of the major economic powers in the world, over an extended period of time, given 
Japan’s significant influence over the global economy. Even the sanctions on India 
and Pakistan after their nuclear tests in 1998 could not be sustained.
  The senior 
official prepared this document preemptively, but to his surprise, no political leader 
ever asked such a question.  
Interestingly, while U.S. experts and officials argue that Japan can produce 
nuclear weapon using its stockpile of Pu 240, Japanese officials and experts argue that 
such nuclear weapon may not be credible, given that no nuclear weapon state employs 
such methodology. A sense of perfection dominates Japan’s examination of nuclear 
weapon production, which contrasts to U.S. concern over Japan’s possible interest in 
crude nukes. 
104
Secondly, Japan’s human resource in nuclear realm has eroded for the past 
decades. Japan’s nuclear expert community is already experiencing difficulty in 
sustaining the civilian nuclear power programs. The university students have 
perceived nuclear power industry as a declining industry for many years, due to the 
declining public popularity over the civil nuclear power from safety concern. The 
emerging concern for climate change may reverse this unpopularity somewhat, but it 
may take time.
) 
105
Thirdly, the Japanese scientist and academic communities are still deeply held 
by its pacifism tradition, despite the country’s general shift toward the “normal 
country”. A majority of the Japanese universities and academic societies still hold on 
to the principle of avoiding involvement in military-related research, which has 
constrained academic experts’ interaction with defence officials since the end of the 
Second World War. There exist few interactions between the defence community and 
scientific/academic communities in Japan. This is particularly true in realm of nuclear 
research. If these communities were to work together, first they would have to start 
from finding a common language, literally. Nuclear weapon is very delicate weaponry 
which requires integration of various sensitive technologies and mechanics in a 
synthesized manner. The existence of technological capabilities alone is insufficient. 
It would require intimate coordination among all relevant stakeholders, including 
engineers, scientists, and weapon specialists, and a vast amount of tacit knowledge 
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(that is, nuance or expertise that are hard to be specified in the form of manual) need 
to be shared among them.106
On political assessment, Shinichi Ogawa of the JDA’s National Institute of 
Defense Studies, pointed to the historical fact that Japan’s suspicion about the 
credibility of U.S. extended deterrence was far greater during the Cold War than it is 
in the 21
 Human elements matter.  
Lastly, selecting location for nuclear weapon facilities would surely be a 
painstaking process for the government. Democracy is blooming in Japanese society 
which barely ceases to criticize the government. Ina addition, political power of local 
governments has strengthened considerably the national government, which 
significantly complicates national government’s policies on every front. Even the 
selection of location for a storage site of radioactive wastes has been stalled over the 
past decades, because of the strong opposition from local communities nationwide.  
 
 
Political Assessments 
st century.107 For example, in May 1969, Mainichi Shimbun conducted a 
public opinion poll which asked, “Do you think that Japan is protected by U.S. 
nuclear weapons or not?” Only 35% said “Yes”, while 24% said “No.” 29% replied 
that U.S. nuclear weapon would rather endanger Japan’s security.108 In another 
opinion poll by Mainichi Shimbun in June 1968, only 17% predicted that Japan would 
never arm itself with nuclear weapons. In another opinion poll by Yomiuri Shimbun 
in 1969, 32% predicted that Japan would possess nuclear weapons within the next 
decade.109 Despite such pessimistic prospects in the 1960s, Japan continued for non-
nuclear status. On contrary, several decades later, in Asahi Shimbun’s opinion poll in 
2005, almost 90% opposed Japan’s possession of nuclear weapon.110
Additionally, Professor Matake Kamiya of Japan’s National Defense 
Academy argued that Japan’s decision to go nuclear would only weaken Japan’s 
international status and the reputation it has built over the past decades. Many 
countries that expressed their support for Japan’s bid for a permanent member of the 
UN Security Council listed Japan’s non-nuclear status as one of the primary reasons 
for their support. Japan’s nuclear option would destroy almost all of the political 
resources. Besides, Japan is already a major economic power in the world, and does 
not need nuclear weapons to assert its power and prestige.
  
111
Furthermore, Japan believes that the credibility of the international non-
proliferation regimes is still sufficiently intact, although these regimes face serious 
challenges in the face of nuclear problems of North Korea and Iran. These regimes are 
certainly imperfect but are seen to have sufficient legitimacy in the international 
community. Japan has, as a result, intensified its efforts to strengthen these regimes by 
complimenting them with various national, bilateral, and multilateral measures for 
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nuclear non-proliferation. Japan assesses that the relative costs associated with non-
compliance with the treaties outweigh, and should continue to outweigh, the ones with 
observing the regimes. 
All in all, detailed examinations of Japan’s nuclear option have pointed to the 
conclusion that the relative demerits of Japan’s nuclear option would far outweigh the 
relative merits. However, these conclusions are based on assumptions that U.S. 
extended deterrence will remain credible. After all, the outcome of Japan’s debate on 
the nuclear option has been, and will continue to be, contingent upon the perceived 
credibility of U.S. extended deterrence in the future.  
 
 
Japan’s Strategic Posture  
In Japan’s view, the credibility of deterrence is elastic since reassurance is a 
political phenomenon eventually.112
Furthermore, Japan has been increasingly interested in consultation with the 
United States on U.S. nuclear doctrine and strategy. During the process of shaping the 
U.S. Nuclear Posture Review 2010 by the U.S. Barak H. Obama administration, an 
unprecedented level of consultation took place between the Japanese and the U.S. 
governments. Then, starting in February 2010, Japan and U.S. formed an official 
dialogue on deterrence, where exchange of views and information on issues related to 
deterrence takes place between the two governments. U.S. consultation with Japan 
about its nuclear posture review has significantly contributed to sustaining Japan’s 
confidence in the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence, according to the Japanese 
officials.
 Thus, Japan has always made every effort to 
ensure that U.S. extended deterrence remain credible, and will continue to do so in the 
future. Over the past decade, Japan has developed a multi-faceted national security 
posture that incorporates the concepts of assurance, dissuasion, deterrence, denial, 
defense, damage confinement, and crisis management, which reinforces Japan’s non-
nuclear position. Especially, Japan has come to place greater weight on its alliance 
with the United States. Missile defense is at the core of Japan’s denial strategy as well 
as a major tool to institutionalize the alliance.  
113
In the current years, Japan has been increasingly concerned about the shifting 
conventional power balance vis-à-vis China as well as the latter’s expanding nuclear 
forces. As the United States and Russia may pursue nuclear disarmament, there is an 
emerging concern in Japan that China may find an opportunity to pursue some 
strategic parity vis-à-vis the United States and Russia in the years ahead. It will 
become very difficult to achieve a strategic stability in arms control among three 
nuclear weapon states at a strategic parity.
 
114
                                               
112 Cossa, Chairman’s Report, U.S.-Japan Strategic Dialogue. 
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114 The Japanese National Institute for Defense Studies, East Asian Strategic Outlook 2010 
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 Then, how should Japan and the United 
States engage China in arms control? On this question, there are conflicting views 
within Japan. Japan recognizes that China already possess sufficient capability to 
target forward deployed U.S. assets and Japanese territory and some capability to 
strike U.S. homeland with nuclear weapons. Without constraint, China may 
significantly improve its capabilities. If U.S. homeland became further vulnerable to 
Chinese nuclear attack, Japan wonders if the United States would take risks to protect 
Japan.  
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However, if the United States might pursue an arms control agreement with 
China, such an agreement might officially recognize China’s limited nuclear 
capability to strike U.S. homeland and sufficient capability to strike Japan. Under 
such scenario, the purpose of deterrence vis-à-vis China may differ between the 
United States and Japan: while Japan would want to protect its homeland from 
Chinese nuclear attack, the United States might tolerate Chinese nuclear capabilities 
to strike Japan so long as China would not fundamentally challenge U.S. position in 
Asia. There is a worry that such an agreement could potentially produce decoupling 
between the U.S. and Japan/Taiwan, especially when China may embrace a theatre 
deterrence strategy, which would target forward deployed U.S. assets and Japanese 
territory.115 This will be a genuine dilemma for Japan-U.S. alliance, as some U.S. 
analyst pointed out.116 If the United States demonstrates restraint towards China, it 
might not necessarily be seen as reassuring to Japan. On contrary, if China continues 
an arms race with the United States, it would significantly alarm Japan.117
Occasionally, there has also been an idea to revise the Three-Non-nuclear 
Principles to enable introduction of U.S. nuclear weapons onto Japan’s soil. In 2003, 
the Panel to Assess Japanese Foreign Policy, the Japanese Foreign Minister’s advisory 
board, recommended to relax one of the principles that prohibit any entrance of 
foreign nuclear weapons into Japanese territory, with the purpose to permit U.S. naval 
assets carrying nuclear weapons to visit Japanese ports. The panel argued that given 
the fact that the Japanese government had for a long time tacitly permitted the entry of 
U.S. naval assets with nuclear weapons into Japan, the Three-Non-Nuclear Principles 
had been in fact “the Two-and-a-Half-Non-Nuclear Principles.”
 China’s 
place in nuclear arms control is a critical factor shaping Japan’s deterrence posture 
and confidence in U.S. extended deterrence. 
In order to hedge against these scenarios, Japan believes that it is essential to 
modernize Japan’s naval and air powers to recover conventional supremacy at tactical 
and theatre levels, in addition to all the other conceivable efforts to strengthen Japan-
U.S. alliance. In this light, Japan strongly aspired to procure U.S. F-22 fighters, which 
did not realize due to the U.S. decision to cease production of F-22. After this U.S. 
decision, Japan has begun to examine the U.S. F-35 fighters as a candidate for its next 
generation fighters in order to achieve air superiority over the PLA. 
118 However, even 
after the North Korea’s nuclear tests in October 2006, a majority of the Japanese 
public expressed their support for the continuation of the Three-Non-Nuclear 
Principles.119
                                               
115 Cossa, Chairman’s Report, U.S.-Japan Strategic Dialogue. Also see, an unpublished paper by 
Ken Jimbo, "Deterrence and Defense in Japanese Security Policy: Regional Orientation of 
Extended Deterrence", written in 2007. 
116 Author’s email communication with Brad Roberts, October 4, 2007. 
117 Ibid. 
118“Kaku Tousai Kan no Ichiji Kikou Younin wo, Gaishou no Shimon Kikan [Foreign Minister’s 
Advisory Board Recommended to Permit the Temporary Visits of US Nuclear Ships to Japanese 
Ports],” Kyodo News, September 18, 2003. 
119 “Hikaku 3 Gensoku, Kongo mo Mamorubeki 80%...Yomiuri Yoron Chousa (Public Opinion 
Poll by Yomiuri Shinbun: Over 80% Support to Continue the Three-Non-Nuclear Principles)”, 
Yomiuri Shimbun, November 20, 2006. 
 This posture has been sustained after North Korea’s second nuclear test 
in May 2009 as well. Also, even from the military perspective, there is a view that 
U.S. nuclear force may be better protected by being deployed away from Japan, 
considering Japan’s lack of strategic depth. (On the other hand, there is also another 
view that the presence of U.S. nuclear weapon in Japan may be essential means to 
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assure Japan, even if it may not be useful for deterrence.) In any event, there is no 
enthusiastic domestic support to revise these principles in Japan yet.  
Moreover, since the U.S. removed tactical nuclear weapons from its naval 
vessels in the early 1990s, Japanese government takes the position that there is no 
longer tactical nuclear weapon on U.S. naval vessels that station at Japanese ports, 
according to Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada.120
In March 2010, during the Diet session, Foreign Minister Okada indicated the 
future possibility of granting entry of U.S. nuclear weapons into Japanese port in the 
event of an emergency where Japan’s safety could not be protected without the 
deployment of U.S. nuclear weapon to Japanese ports.”
 In addition, under the INF 
Agreement, the U.S. no longer possesses the intermediate-range nuclear missiles to 
deploy in Japan. Unless the INF Treaty is abrogated, there is no nuclear missile that 
the U.S. deploys to Japan to target China or North Korea. However, Russia currently 
argues to abrogate this INF Treaty. If this comes true, the issues of Japan’s principle 
that prohibits any entrance of foreign nuclear weapons into Japanese territory could be 
revisited.  
121
Finally, as noted, ballistic missile defense (BMD) is at the core of Japan’s 
denial strategy and a major tool to institutionalize the alliance. The BMD’s immediate 
objective is to defeat incoming medium-range ballistic missiles from North Korea. 
Japan’s BMD system consists of Aegis destroyers to intercept ballistic missiles at the 
mid-course phase, Patriot PAC-3 to intercept ballistic missiles at the terminal phase, 
the sensor systems to detect and track ballistic missiles, and the command, control, 
battle management and communications systems.
 Thus, the Japanese foreign 
minister has admitted the possibility to change some element of the Three-Non-
nuclear Principles. On the other hand, however, the Japanese Prime Minister Naoto 
Kan pledged to sustain the Three-Non-Nuclear Principles during his visit to 
Hiroshima in August 2010. Japan may not likely change these Principles anytime 
soon. 
122
As Dr. Lawrence Freedman, a British strategist once observed: “acquiring 
nuclear capability is a statement of a lack of confidence in all alternative security 
 Japan’s BMD architecture 
consists of 4 Aegis destroyers with added BMD capability, 16 Patriot PAC-3 Fire 
Units, 4 FPS-5 radars and 7 FPS-3 upgraded radars through command, control, battle 
management and communications systems. Also, Japan has cooperated with the 
United States to improve BMD capabilities against an adversary’s use of decoys and 
diversified BM flight trajectories as well as to expand the protection areas. The BMD 
is expected to complicate an adversary’s strategic calculation about the probability of 
a successful attack on Japanese targets, thereby creating uncertainty regarding the 
relative merits of launching such a missile toward Japan. This is expected to 
strengthen deterrence further. 
 
 
Conclusion 
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arrangements.”123  Put in the context of Japan’s national security, Japan has so far 
retained faith in “alternative security arrangements” that are anchored on the Japan-
U.S. security relationship. In the past, the process of the development of the Japan-
U.S. alliance has demonstrated at least one consistent pattern: namely, every time 
Japan debated new security arrangements at a time of strategic shift in the 
environment, Japan always chose pragmatic arrangement. Through careful calculation 
of relative costs and merits associated with each option, Japan eventually adopted new 
security measures within the renewed framework of the Japan-U.S. alliance. As 
Victor Cha of Georgetown University observed, “[a]s long as U.S. commitments 
remain firm, the likelihood of Japan seeking alternative internal or external balancing 
options is low. In other words, the causal arrow is more likely to run in the direction 
from weakened U.S. alliance to alternative balancing options, rather than from 
alternative balancing options to weakened U.S. alliance.”124
After all, Japan’s discussion of its nuclear option should not be necessarily 
regarded as a deplorable or alarming phenomenon. Certainly, some extreme opinions 
that support Japan’s possession of indigenous nuclear weapons might seem shocking 
in the initial phase of such discussions. However, as many political leaders, officials 
and experts join such discussions, more pragmatic perspectives begin to shape these 
discussions, which helps the Japanese public understand the costs and benefits of the 
nuclear option and shapes their view of what option is in the best national interests of 
Japan. As Brad Glosserman, the director of research at the Pacific forum CSIS, 
observed, such scrutiny should be seen as rather healthy. Indeed, as Glosserman 
argued, “Japan’s study of every security option is essential to a real national security 
debate. Like North Korea, Japan needs to know that possessing nuclear weapons 
won’t enhance its security. In the past, it was a given; today, it must be proven.”
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123 Lawrence Freedman, “Great Powers, Vital Interests and Nuclear Weapons,” Survival (Winter 
1994/1995), p. 36. 
124 Victor D. Cha, “Defensive Realism and Japan’s Approach toward Korean Reunification,” NBR 
Analysis Vol. 14, No. 1 (June 2003), pp. 9-10. 
125 Brad Glosserman, “Nukes still won’t help Japan,” The Japan Times, August 7, 2003. 
 In 
the past, certainly, such pragmatic discussions have led Japan to pursue a more 
deliberate consideration of national interests, and to Japan’s holding on to a sound 
national security strategy. 
In this sense, Japan’s discussion of nuclear option per sea should not be seen 
as undermining the security and stability of Asia. Rather, it is a prerequisite, in a way, 
to foster healthy discussion over security policy in Japan, to strengthen the Japan-U.S. 
alliance, and to prepare for new security challenges in evolving strategic environment 
in this region. 
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